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### Peer discovery
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* Discovery of nearby peers via Bluetooth and/or wifi
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* Discover nearby peers via Bluetooth and/or wifi
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* Maybe: Gossip the details of nearby/recently connected peers
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### Network structure
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* Maybe: Peers that serve to improve connectivity between users' personal devices ("hubs")
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* Maybe: Hubs are reachable via Bluetooth and/or wifi
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* Maybe: Hubs are reachable via the internet or national intranet
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* Issue: Exposure of users' IP addresses to hubs that are reachable via the internet or national intranet (without Tor)
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* Issue: Exposure of users' IP addresses to hubs (without Tor)
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* Issue: Hubs may concentrate power and access to metadata in the hands of techies
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* Issue: Hubs may have dynamic IP addresses and be behind NAT/firewalls
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* Maybe: Hubs publish encrypted and signed IP:port details, which are gossiped by peers and can be authenticated and decrypted by peers authorised to connect to the hub
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* Maybe: Hubs provide a STUN-like service to enable other hubs to discover their current IP:ports
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* Issue: Operating a hub may expose users to greater risk than using a personal device
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* Issue: Operating a hub may expose users to greater risk than participating in the mesh via a personal device
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### Message propagation
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* End-to-end encryption with forward secrecy
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* Maybe: U-ACKs or signed receipts to enable peers to stop propagating messages that have been delivered
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* Maybe: Destination addresses or flow labels to enable peers to route unicast messages intelligently
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* Maybe: Reverse-path routing of replies
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* Maybe: Labels for encrypted messages to enable recipients to recognise which decryption key should be used
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* Issue: Labels may expose metadata about which peers are communicating with each other
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* Maybe: Periodic rotation of labels to reduce metadata exposure
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* Issue: Epidemic forwarding may not scale to large networks or high traffic volumes
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* Maybe: Distinct, invitation-based sync contexts ("swarms")
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* Issue: A user's membership of a swarm may be sensitive information
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* Maybe: Peer discovery is independent from swarm membership, so that swarm membership is not exposed to non-members via peer discovery
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* Maybe: Peer discovery is independent from swarm membership, so that swarm membership is not exposed via peer discovery
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* Maybe: Peers can discover which swarms they have in common (if any) without revealing which other swarms they belong to (private set intersection)
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* Maybe: Peers can discover other swarm members via DHT
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* Issue: Exposure of swarm membership to DHT nodes
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