... | ... | @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ If you import an RSS feed it's converted into a Briar blog, so you can share ind |
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# When do posts in forums/groups/blogs get shared with others?
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A post will be shared with someone if all of these conditions are fullfilled:
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A post will be shared with someone if all of these conditions are met:
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1. they're your contact, and
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1. both of you subscribe to the forum/group/blog where the message was posted, and
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... | ... | @@ -58,21 +58,21 @@ In more technical terms, each forum/group/blog has a distribution graph where th |
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# Can I have multiple identities/profiles/accounts?
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Short Answer: No. That is not supported by Briar.
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Short Answer: No, that is not supported by Briar.
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Long Answer: In a p2p network it's hard to prevent identities from being linked to each other if they live on the same device.
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Consider the scenario where you have two identities, `A` and `B`. A contact of `A` and a contact of `B` get together and try to find out whether `A` and `B` are the same person. What information could they use?
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* First, the times when `A` and `B` are online. In a p2p network we can't hide this from our contacts
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* Second, the network addresses that they use to communicate with `A` and `B`. If we use Tor then we can have a separate hidden service address for each identity, so that's fine. But with WiFi and Bluetooth, the contacts can compare the addresses we gave them and see that it's the same device.
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* First, the times when `A` and `B` are online. In a p2p network we can't hide this from our contacts.
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* Second, the network addresses that they use to communicate with `A` and `B`. If we use Tor then we can have a separate hidden service address for each identity, so that's fine. But with Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, the contacts can compare the addresses we gave them and see that it's the same device.
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* Third, they could look for information leaks at the application layer. For example they could try to introduce `A` to `B`, and see if the protocol behaves differently than it would if `A` and `B` were on different devices. If we supported multiple identities, we'd have to be very careful to avoid any leaks like this in our application-layer code.
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# Can I use the same account with several devices?
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Short answer: No that's not possible.
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Short answer: No, that's not possible.
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Long answer: Allowing the same account to be used on more than one device is a hard problem to solve in delay tolerant p2p networks. The difficult part is how to reconcile conflicting actions performed on different devices such as accepting an invitation on one device and declining it on another.
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Our best idea to address this is to have a single authoritive main device that your other devices connect to in order to control your account.
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Long answer: Allowing the same account to be used on more than one device is a hard problem to solve in delay-tolerant p2p networks. The difficult part is how to reconcile conflicting actions performed on different devices, such as accepting an invitation on one device and declining it on another.
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Our best idea to address this is to have a single authoritive main device that your other devices connect to in order to access your account.
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# How do I backup my account?
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... | ... | @@ -86,23 +86,23 @@ Your Briar link contains a public key and it is safe to publish in the same way |
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# Can people track my online status if I publish my `briar://` link?
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No, your online status isn't exposed by publishing your `briar://` link. For strangers to be able to connect to you, you must first add them as a contact, otherwise they won't know where to find you in the Tor network.
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No, your online status isn't exposed by publishing your `briar://` link. Only your contacts can tell whether you're online.
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For a more technical explanation, for adding each new contact a separate Tor hidden service gets created whose address depends on both your own and your contact's public key. See the [Bramble Rendezvous Protocol](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/-/blob/master/protocols/BRP.md#2-the-rendezvous-protocol) for more information.
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For a more technical explanation: Each time you add a contact, a separate Tor hidden service is created whose address depends on both your own and your contact's public key. See the [Bramble Rendezvous Protocol](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/-/blob/master/protocols/BRP.md#2-the-rendezvous-protocol) for more information. Once the contact has been added, Briar sends them the address of the long-term Tor hidden service that's used for receiving connections from your contacts.
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# Does Briar provide anonymity?
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No. Briar does not conceal your identity from your contacts. It provides **unlinkability** but not **anonymity**. This means nobody else can discover who your contacts are, but your contacts *may* be able to discover who you are.
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For example, Briar shares your Bluetooth address with your contacts so they can connect to you via Bluetooth when they're nearby. Your contacts could use this information to confirm a guess about your identity. Your Bluetooth address is shared even if you add a contact remotely by exchanging `briar://` links.
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For example, Briar shares your Bluetooth address with your contacts so they can connect to you via Bluetooth. Your contacts could use this information to confirm a guess about your identity. Your Bluetooth address is shared even if you add a contact remotely by exchanging `briar://` links.
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Other device information shared with contacts in order to connect with them:
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* the five most recent IPv4 LAN addresses and ports
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* the most recent IPv6 link-local address for the Wi-Fi interface (on some android devices the ipv6 link-local address is based on the hardware MAC, so it has similar privacy issues to the Bluetooth address)
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* the address of Briar's Tor onion service
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* The five most recent IPv4 LAN addresses and ports for the Wi-Fi interface
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* The most recent IPv6 link-local address for the Wi-Fi interface (on some Android devices the IPv6 link-local address is based on the hardware MAC, so it has similar privacy issues to the Bluetooth address)
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* The address of Briar's Tor onion service
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None of this should reveal anything about your location or identity on its own, but it could be used to confirm a guess about your identity (e.g. "network logs showed that the suspect's laptop received address `192.168.0.222` from the router in the cafe, which is consistent with the LAN IP address we received from the anonymous whistleblower".
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None of this should reveal anything about your location or identity on its own, but it could be used to confirm a guess about your identity (e.g. "network logs showed that the suspect's laptop received address `192.168.0.222` from the router in the cafe, which is consistent with the LAN IP address we received from the anonymous whistleblower").
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# Has Briar been independently audited?
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... | ... | @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ Briar asks for the following permissions: |
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* "Let app always run in background" (on some phones this is called "Ignore battery optimizations"). Briar needs this permission so it can receive messages while the app is in the background.
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* Permission to access the camera. Briar asks for this permission when adding a contact who's nearby so that Briar can scan a QR code. Briar doesn't use the camera at any other time.
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* Permission to access your location. Briar asks for this permission when adding a contact who's nearby so that Briar can discover nearby Bluetooth devices. This is required by Android because in certain cases, knowing that a certain Bluetooth device is nearby might reveal your location. Briar doesn't store, track or share your location in any way other than discovering Bluetooth devices.
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* Permission to access your location. Briar asks for this permission when adding a contact who's nearby so that Briar can discover nearby Bluetooth devices. This permission is required by Android, because knowing that a certain Bluetooth device is nearby might reveal your location. Briar doesn't store, track or share your location in any way other than discovering Bluetooth devices.
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# What do the ### symbols next to people's nicknames mean?
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... | ... | |