1. The things we're really trying to protect - contact identities,
message contents, etc - can't be erased from memory because they're
encapsulated inside objects we don't control.

2. Long-term secrets can't be protected by erasing them from memory
because they're stored in the database and the database key has to be
held in memory whenever the app's running.

3. If the runtime uses a compacting garbage collector then we have no
way to ensure an object is erased from memory.

4. Trying to erase secrets from memory makes the code more complex.

Conclusion: Let's not try to protect secrets from an attacker who can
read arbitrary memory locations.

- replaced use of Object instance mutex with a private final Lock object
- replaced Object signaling with specific condition signalling

DuplexOutgoingSession flushes its output stream if it's idle for a
transport-defined interval, causing an empty frame to be sent. The TCP
and Tor plugins use a socket timeout equal to twice the idle interval to
detect dead connections.

See bugs #27, #46 and #60.

This reverts commit bb3ec5a2.

It's in the git history if we ever decide to use it.

This fixes some lint warnings and may also fix dev task #102.